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"TENDERNESS FOR THE FINITE": 
REFLECTIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF JOSEP FERRA TER MORA 
WILLIAM KLUBACK 
We begin our conversation with Ferrater not by surveying the 
long list ofhis publications, but with a story because it is ittustra-
tive of one of his major phitosophical concerns : the ques tion of 
meaning and reality.' This question arises because man is depen-
dent and needy, his capacity to know does not embrace the know-
able, and this gap between our capacity to know and what can be 
known is vast and the more and more we attempt to master the 
knowable, our abitity to do so becomes ever more remote. Only in 
the renunciation of the attempt to master knowledge can we find 
refuge from that agonizing fact that we are not the master offacts, 
but we can be, and must be, the source of meaning. We have the 
need to proj ec t purpose, to recognize th e fact that we cannot only 
comprehend sensible reality, but we can think ideas, we can not 
only be determined by and in empirical reality; we can grasp our 
freedom through metaphysical ideas; we belong not only to the 
world of cognition, but equatty to the realm of ideas. We are 
beings who can comprehend the fact that reality depends upon 
how we think it, although we can assume that it is not antagonistic 
to thinking, we can alsoassume that it does not take its meaning 
solely from our projections of purpose. We are, therefore, conti-
nuously changing and modifying our interpretations and our va-
I For a rece nt bibliography see: Reine Guy, "La Théorie du sens chezJosé Fe-
rrater Mora", in Pbilo.wl'bl'.\" i¡'':'ú/lIl'J ,'1 i¡'':'o-améri({/il1s en l'xiI, TouIouse, 1977, 
115-16. Two additio nal works should be mentioned: D,· la lIIillcria t/la razólI , Ma-
drid, 1979 ; Éliw t/pliwt!t/: Dd t/¡'orlo t/1t/7Iioll'llrit/, Madrid, 1981. Thi s Ia st volume 
was writtcn with Priscilb Collll . 
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lues; the world is continuously yielding new perceptions and po s-
sibilities; we face ever new and different revelations in the smallest 
as well as in the most extensive reality. We confront reality, think 
differently of it when distanced from it; closeness causes it to es-
cape because we lose a sense of its dimension and significance. 
Space and time are conditions, in which and through which, 
meaning comes forth or fades away; they are perspectives, in 
which and through which, being is transformed into meaning. 
Ferrater is not hesitant to admit that men of literature, at 
times, are more perceptive of philosophical quest ions than are 
philosophers. Being and meaning, el ser y el sentida, are contrasts 
that reveal apparent conf1icting realities. The greater the being, 
the less the meaning; the greater the meaning, the less the being. 
But theoretical statements seem to have less impact than the tell-
ing of a story, "El hechizado" ("The Bewitched") of Francisco 
Ayala. 2 The Indian Gonzalez Labo tells ofhis long journey to the 
court ofCharles 11, where he envisioned that he would see the cen-
ter of world power, the heart of that vast Spanish empire that en-
circled the globe. His journey took him through the riches of a 
world filled with goods, events, and anxieties. As he aproached 
the end ofhis adventure, he was even more fascinated by the mul-
tiplicity of rooms and antechambers; it was as ifhe were at the na-
vei of the universe, the proper place for "la Realidad". In the pres-
ence of"Su Majestad", he was even more startled by the luxuriant 
splendor of the hali in which He was seated . Suddenly an incon-
gruence became apparent: the rich clothing ofHis Majesty stank 
of the odor of urine. Yet, it had its reason. Finally a deeper truth 
was revealed, and this he told at the end of his story with a few 
words. Seeing an unknown pers on at the door, the little dog was 
startled and His Majesty was disturbed, but then he saw the head 
ofhis dwarf and he was quieted. Doña Antoñita approached Him. 
l El Ser y el sentida, Madrid, 1967, 292-93 . 
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His Majesty gave his h;lI1d to kiss , but a monkey jumped upon it 
and played around him, demanding his attention and wanting to 
be petted. I then understood and leh in silence . 
The story tells much of the difference between being and 
meaning. The being ofthe king was identical to his power, which 
extended throughout the world, but the richness and splendor of 
his outward tOrm corresponded ¡¡ttle to the smell ofurine that ra-
diated from his body. His dwarf, his little dog, his monkey occu-
pied his time and the concern of this mighty and powerful king. 
One could only withdraw in respectful silence. How vast the con-
trast between being and meaning, between the magnificence and 
splendor of the king as symbol ofworld power and the poverty of 
the reality displayed in the dwarf-jester, the monkey, and the dog. 
Here being overwhelms meaning, reduces it to silence; it reduces 
man to withdrawal and inactivity. 
This problem can be approached from another perspective. 
Franz Kafka created a world in parables and paradoxes. Only in 
these do we comprehend the relationship between meaning and 
being, a relationship revealed only in parable or in paradox. In 
"An Imperial Message" Kafka relates a parable: the Emperor sends 
a message to a hum ble servant, Lu from the palace, and to this ser-
vant alone. He whispers the message in the ear ofhis servant, who 
must repeat it to the Emperor, who is dying. The messenger begins 
his journey bearing the sign of the Emperor, but the palace is so 
vast, the multitudes so great, that he only dreams of reaching the 
open fields and how he would run ifhe could only escape the pa-
lace and its infinite rooms and crowds, but the task is hopeless. 
"Nobody could fight his way through here, least of all one with a 
message from a dead mano But you sit at your window when even-
ing falls and dream it to yourself. " , 
.I Parables and ParadoxrJ, New York, 1972 , 14-15. 
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This parable tells another story. Here we are conhonted wirh 
meaning which cannot penetrate being, for which being has no 
capacity ofreceptivity, a being that remains resistant, that can be 
penetrated only in dreams but refuses, in its mass and impenetra-
bility, the possibility ofa message which would set aside its impe-
netrability and autonomy. The source of meaning is dying, the 
messenger has a hopeless task, the message hom a dying man can 
find no response in a world ofbeing, in a world where meaning has 
died and where it survives only in remembrances and dreams. 
Man is crushed in being; he either dreams or he leaves in silence. 
But this can become a parable and in reality gain the world; but 
again there is a loss, for parable has become reality and you have 
last. Kafka outlines this paradox: 
Ifyou only followed the pH.lbles you yourselves would become p.lr.lbles and with 
th.ll rid of.lll your d.lily Colres. Another s.lid: I bet th,ll is ,liso ol parable. The tirst 
s.lid: You h.lve won. The second s.lid: But, unfortun.llely, only in parable. The 
tirst s.lid: No, in rcality: in p.lr.lble you h.lVe lost.' 
We win in reality, in parable we always lose. Parable is the pe-
rennial conflict between being and meaning, deciding nothing 
but opening everything. To have victories we remain in reality, to 
think in parables we remain with paradoxes open to the changing, 
the possible, and the probable. The parable is freedom, the over-
coming of fixity, reality emerges in the creativity of the imagina-
tion, in the negation of being, in the refusal and denial of every 
given and determined object to perpetuate its fixity and become 
demonic, destructive ofall forms oflitè. The parable is the source 
ofincongruity, that incongruity ofexperience in which "Nothing-
ness is a permanent possibility of the real",' a possibility which 
I !Ilit/. , I I. 
U Sar ,.¡ ' <"IIlit/li, 292. 
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makes it impossible to grasp experience as a totality, but to com-
prehend it as always emerging and developing. The parable is a 
source of ongoing interpretation, it refuses the oppressive charac-
ter ofbeing which reduces to silence the man who stands before it. 
We are reminded of another short parable ofKafka which shows 
another aspect ofFerrater's tenderness for the finite, a tenderness 
which sees in finitude infinite possibility and development, a 
multiplicity and multiformity which defies, yet challenges the 
imagination, denies explanation but is open to an ever-widening 
comprehension, the source of an ever-renewed thinking. 
Kafka relates a parable, "Before the Law": 
Before rhe LJW srands J doorkecper on guard. To rhis doorkeeper comes a m,In 
hom rhe country who begs for admittance to the Law. Bur rhe doorkeeper sa}'s 
thar he cannor admir rhe man at the moment. The man, on retlection, asks ifhe 
will be allowed then, to enter !ater. uit is possible" answers rhe doorkeeper." 
The man grows older, the guard grows more gruesome and forbid-
ding. Older and older the man grows, his life becomes identified 
with the doorkeeper. Finally, weak, stiff, and dying, he asks, "How 
does it corne about then, that in all these years no one has corne 
seeking admittance but me?" The doorkeeper replies, "No one but 
you could gain admittance through this door, since this door was 
int.ended only for you. l arn now going to shut it."7 The Law can 
suffocate, overwhelm, and destroy; there are realities which can-
not be approached and whose nearness overpowers us, reduces us 
to silence and finally to death . The divinity burns the mouth of 
the prophet; man cannot see God face to face; God appears in a 
whirlwind; we can only see his back, attempts one after another to 
point out the awesome power ofbeing which can suppress, dimin-
" P,Irt/UtS, 61-65. 
; ¡bid., 65. 
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ish, and finally end our capacity to think, to give meaning, to re-
deem our place in the universe. Whatever comes forth in such gi-
gantic force eliminates that dialogue ofbeing and meaning, reduc-
. ing either one to the other or the latter to the former. It is this re-
duction which brings the human experience to the respectful sil-
ence of nonbeing, to the death ofbeing before the all-encompas-
sing; this experience destroys that inexhaustible and enchanting 
quality of incertitude and precariousness which is embraced and 
emerges in finitude, the rejection of all glib theoretical and abs-
tract generalizations and conceptualizations that stifle its unique-
ness. 
Ferrater tells us that 
the meaning ofan expression is not the being ofthe expression; the meaning of 
life is not the being oflife; the meaning ofan Jct is not the being ofthis act and so 
on .' 
What Ferrater has grasped more deeply than other ph ilo-
sophers of our age is the parabolic and paradoxical nature of expe-
rience. He has that tenderness for the never-ending possibiliti es 
that lie in reality, the feeling for its mobility, its capacity to be 
transformed and transfigured, to be comprehended as symbol and 
metaphor, and to be grasped as the continuous flow of meaning 
which is ever emerging from symbol, from parable, and from para-
dox. Kafka tells of a man who orders his horse from the stable: 
The servant did not understand me . I myself went to the stable, saddled my horse 
and mounted. In the distance I heard a bugle call, I asked him what it meant. He 
knew nothing and heard nothing. At the ga te he stopped me asking: "Where are 
you riding to, master?" "I don't know," I said, "only away from here, away from 
here. Always away from here , only by doing so can I reach my destination ." "Yes." 
H El Ser .y el smlido, 271. 
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I an swered, "Oidn't I say so? Away-From-Here, that is my destination ." "You have 
no provisions with you" he sa id. "I need none," I said, "the journey is so long thatl 
mu st die ofhunger ifI don't get anything on the way. No provisions can save me. 
Fo r it is, unfortunately, a truly immense journey."" 
The journey of Ferrater has been an intimate and long one 
through the labyrinth ofthe human experience,approached from 
a multitude of perspectives and designs, the richness of meanings 
ref1ecting the grandeur of man's imaginative capacities to over-
corne the limits of his knowledge, to realize in himself that mas-
tery of the realm of meaning which is the ground of that finite-in-
finite dialectic which is characteristic of our refusal to be silenced 
in being, demanding that right of transcendence which challenges 
every fixity which attempts to determine and control empirical 
reality. 
At the end of a novel by the Cuban writer Alejo Carpentier 
there is a scene characteristic of Ferrater's thought: 
At the end ofhis life Ti Noel understood something fundamental: that man never 
knows for whom he suffers and hopes. He suffers and works for people whom he 
will never know, and in turn they will suffer, hope and work for others who neither 
will be happy, since man desires a happiness beyond that which is given him. But 
man 's greatness is to wish to better what is, by imposing upon himselftasks . In the 
heavenly kingdom there is no greatness, no conquest because there everything is 
fixed hierarchy, the c1ear unknown, existing endlessly, impossibility of sacrifice, 
only tranquility and pl easure. Vet, weighed down with pains and tasks, beautiful 
in his misery, capable ofloving within his torments , man alone can find his great-
ness, his highest realm in the kingdom of this world. 10 
Meaning, Ferrater tells us, "is not in reality because it is the 
true reality in one ofits fundamental dispositions; it is the ontolo-
9 Parables, 189 . 
10 De la maleria a la razón, 188-89 . 
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gical disposition of realities". Meaning is a fàct which is not de-
duced from anything but itself; it is a primordial given. Meaning 
is, because man can realiz~ it, the expression of that natural dia-
lectic ofbeing and meaning, in and through which, man emerges 
as man. Yet this emerging reveals also the possibility of hiding, of 
withdrawal, of falling back into nonbeing, in to silence. Man 
stands between meaning and being, between silence and dis-
course, between anonymity and action. He is like the man who is 
thirsty and stands before a spring from which he is cut off only by 
a c1ump of bushes. 
But he is divided against himself: one part overlooks the whole, sees thJt he is 
standing here and that the spring is just beside him; but another part notices no-
thing, has at most a divination that the tirst part sees all. But as he notices nothing 
he cannot drink. 11 
If we believe that all genuine human activity results in signi-
ficant action, in the capacity to transform and transfigure , to cre-
ate in parable, symbol, and metaphor, then we realize that mean-
ing is not only the tool of man, but the reality in which man dis-
covers himself. "El sentido produce el senti do" sounds like a for-
mula with which we can now easily define Ferrater's thought, but 
the expression is more because it is not a definition, nor is it an ex-
planation; it is a thought, an embracing comprehension which 
continuously yields meaning; it has symbolic reality. But, like the 
parable of the spring, there is a seeing and a nonseeing, a desire to 
comprehend and the refusal to comprehend. Ferrater's philoso-
phy is a journey through the infinite variety of the human experi-
ence; it is parabolic and paradoxical only becau se experience does 
not c1early and precisely yield itself to our cognition and its orga-
II Parf/blt'S, 185. 
I 
I 
I 
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nizing conceptualizations. It is an experience which we are forced 
to think and structure with the imagination, knowing that every 
moment of thought is only a preparation for a new and different 
moment; knowing that identity and nonidentity are joined in 
identity opens vast possibilities for the imagination and for think-
ing, which must reflect upon this imagination in its infinite possi-
bilities. This is neither an esoteric nor an exoteric perspective; phi-
losophy is the expression of freedom in which man discovers what 
it is to be human. This discovery he makes in his social, political, 
and theoretical speculations, actions, and relationships; he dis-
covers in language, already-formulated structures which express 
meanings and in which he unveils the structured meaning of reality. 
The reality, which he believes he structures with language, is alrea-
dy a reality structured with meaning which is realized and embo-
died in the language that he develops and employs to express 
meaning. Language actualizes the descriptibilidad of the world ana-
logously to how knowledge actualizes its cognoscibi!idad.1 2 Ferrater 
touches the most profound aspect of the human experience, rea-
lized in that intimate and natural dialectic of subject and object, 
of structure and structured, of finite and infinite; it is the experi-
ence that emerges from negation, i.e., from freedom. 
The words ofFerrater awaken in us thoughts which embrace a 
philosophy of experience justifying neither subject nor object, 
but revealing an all-encompassing reality in which they are em-
braced like identity and nonidentity in thought and action . The 
all-encompassing is a primordial reality which is ever emerging in 
that intercourse of subject and object transcending both but rea-
lized in them. Gaston Bachelard spoke of the same phenomenon 
when he said: 
12 El S,T )' ci .m/tir/o, 275 . 
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... it must be admitted that fright does not corne hom the object ... fright is born 
and reborn ceaselessly in the subject, within the reader's sou I. The narrator has 
not confronted his readerwith a frightening situation, rather, he has put him in a 
fright situation. He has stirred the fundamental dynamic imagination ... in short, 
the imagination is sufficiently vivid in the subject to impose its visions, its terrors, 
its sorrows .. .. The dynamic imagination is a primary reality .1.l 
The soul of man has already in it all that it is induced to bring 
forth; it is not a mere reaction to the objeet but a world of dreams, 
frights, transfigurations, and transformations preeeding the reali-
ties whieh awaken and bring them forth from their primordial 
ground. Experience remains the consequence of the emerging 
forms ineited in the soul by external reality. 
rf Ferrater teaches us something about the labyrinth of the 
human experienee, it is that there is always something more that 
can be said; experienee is parabolie, open to meanings; it refuses 
definition; it awakes in thought; there is in man the need to ask 
about purpose; man is, in and through the faet of meaning, teleo-
logieal, i.e., he has an inherent desire to organize his world in 
terms of an end or purpose. Kafka illustrates this with a short par-
able: 
It was very early in the morning, the streets clean and deserted. I was on my way to 
the station. As I compared the tower clock with my watch I realized it was much 
later than I had thought and that I had to hurry; the shock ofthis discovery made 
me feel uncertain ofthe way, I wasn't very well acquainted with the town as yet; 
fortunately, there was a policeman at hand, I ran to him and breathlessly asked 
him the way . He smiled and said: "You are asking me the way?" "Yes," I said, 
"since I cannot find it myself." "Give it up! Give it up!" said he, and turned with a 
sud den jerk, like someone who wants to be alone with his laughter.'~ 
I.l On POi'lir Imagill(/fiol1 t1l1d R" vaie, Indianapolis , 1971, 14· 15. 
I~ Tbc Complt'fe Sfonn, New York, 1972,456. 
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The parable reminds us that the "way" is not preseribed; it is the 
task whieh befalls ea eh of us to diseover both in ourselves and in 
external experienee. The ways are there; they have always been 
there, visible or not, knowable or unknown, eomprehensible or 
ineomprehensible; the ways are not imposed, their reality de-
pends upon our eapaeity to bring them forth. 
Many peo ple prowl about Mount Sinai. Their speech is blurred , either they He 
ga rrulaus or they shout or th ey a re tac iturn . But none of them comes straight 
down a broad , newly m ade, smooth road that daes its part in ma king one's strides 
lang and swifter. ls 
The visible and the invisible, the eomprehensible and the ineom-
prehensible, that dialeetie of subjeet and objeet which bears with-
in itself its other, not as an opposition or a eontradietion, but as a 
moment of the self, ref1eeting upon the objeetivity of subjeetivity 
and the subjeetivity of objeetivity, it is this dialeetie whieh mirrors 
the meaning which is characteristie of reality, not a meaning 
which we inject into it, but a meaning whieh is its being and whieh 
our ref1ection reveals. 
Man, Ferrater tells us, is in the world "like a physicist in his 
science, a revolutionary in his cause, a lover in is love".l b Man 
must find his place in the world, a world that is growing, whose 
vast dimensions are as yet only glimpsed at, whose place in it man 
is forever discovering and rediscovering. This revolutionary na-
ture of man is to be seen primarily in his imaginative powers, 
whieh we eomprehend as an inner "fire" with the power to trans-
form and transfigure all that surrounds it. lt is a power diffieult to 
control and to limit, for in man and in mankind it exhibits never-
ending forms and structures. "Imagination", Baehelard tell us, 
15 Parables, 45 . 
16 El Ser y el sentida, 283 . 
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is the true source ofpsychic production. Psychi ca lly, we are created by our reveri e 
- created and limited by our reverie - for it is the reverie which delin ea tes the t'ur-
thest limits ot' our mind. Imagination works at the summit of the mind like a 
flJme, and it is to th e region ofthe metaphor of metaphor ... that we must look for 
the secret ofthe mutu ant forces ... Thi s is th e very problem ofcreat ive life: how to 
have a future while not forgetting th e past; how to ensu re that.passiun be made lu-
min ous without being cooled?17 
Imagination is the "fire" which is both subject and object, which is 
like the lover whose love is the source of the love with which the 
beloved loves the love with which it is loved, and the lover loves 
and transfigures the love of the beloved. rhe power to integrate 
subject and object is in perpetual evolution and development; it 
reveals that infinite force of imaginative thinking which in every 
moment of realization rises to transcendence, goes from particu-
larity to universality and from finitude to infinitude. Ferrater has 
made it possible for us to grasp experience in its vital intensity and 
intimacy because he has made every moment ofits realization the 
source of his interest. 
Ferrater's thought is motivated by a refusal and rejection of 
all absolutisms. If we mean by absolutism that demonic fixity , the 
attempt to determine a value or a being so as to allow it to be total-
ity, then we realize that absolutism is the denial ofthat dialectic of 
freedom which affirms that negation is the ground of all reality; 
whatever is can be negated, the negation of negation is the free-
dom, in which and through which, man moves from potentiality 
to actuality, endeavors to find meaning, makes action possible, 
and gives to life that self-criticism which makes it possible to move 
from immediacy to mediacy and to reason. Ferrater believes that 
life stands between the poles of being and meaning, but we may 
think that being and meaning are dialectical moments ofthe sam e 
17 Tbl' P~y(bolll/(¡/J'si.\ "{Fi",, Boston, 1964. 110-11. 
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reality, the reality which emerges in the freedom rooted in nega-
tion. There is an "interest of reason" which Kant says is 
illlpcllcd by tcndcncy ofits n,1turc to go out be yo nd thc ticld ofits clllpiric,11 Clll-
ploYlllcnt ,Ind to vcnt urc in a purc cmploymcnt, by Illeans otïde,ls ,llonc, to thc 
ut most limits of,111 knowlcdge, ,1I1d not to be S,1tistied S,IVC through the compk-
tion of its coursc in ,I selt~subsistcnt systcm,1tic wholc. 'S 
Reason understands itselfto be "interested", to be practica\. What 
this means for man is th at his life is not limited to the realm of 
phenomena, to that of empirical reality, to th~ organization and 
definition of the given; he is not encompassed in a realm of rJcts 
which reduces him to knowledge; he has the capacity to think, to 
act, to judge, which he must do becJuse the reallll off1Cts is always 
incomplete and must be interpreted and given purpose. It is not 
what something is that is important, but what something can and 
ought to be; the question is always the significance or Illeaning of 
the is, its purpose as action and judgment. Meaning leads to ac-
tion, the purpose ofman in the world is to do, to change rea lity, to 
transfigure and transform, to create through the imagination a 
world that is yet to be, but can be and should be . What is essential 
to man is not knowledge, but action, the judgment in terms ofac-
tion, the moral judgment which is conscious ofitselfas judglllent, 
not arbitrariness and whim, but judgment for action in terms of 
moral responsibility . Meaning is possible because there is being, 
and being is comprehensible because there is meaning. 
Ferrater tells us that his purpose has been the study of"real-
ity", i.e., the world that is, assuming that there is no reality that 
transcends this reality, that the reality that is, is the realization of 
reality, the realization ofwhat is and what is not, but can be, i.e., it 
is the identity of identity and nonidentity . Thus, reality is the 
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ground ofthe reality that is, as well as the reality that is not. What 
becomes clear and should be clear is that being, the being of 
things, is comprehensible only ifbeing is meaning and belongs to 
a reality that already has meaning, which precedes being "because 
fact and the given are only revealed to the one who questions 
them in the search for meaning" .I') A philosophy ofmeaning must 
assume that prior to being there is reality which is receptive to 
meaning, and from the perspective ofthis reality what is called be-
ing is meaning. When fact and the given are thought in te.rms of 
purpose and end, then \Ve are no longer dealing with being, but 
with meaning, with that indissoluble bond ofbeing and meaning. 
We therefore discover that only meaning has being, and when the 
verb /0 be is properly used with being it says meaning ;s. With a 
comprehension ofthis grounding of meaning in being and being 
in meaning we arrive at a philosophy ofmeaning "because what is, 
does not refuse to give its meaning to the one who seeks this mean-
ing" .211 Similar to the parable and the paradox, the meaning is gi-
ven when it is sought, when thinking is the search for meaning, 
when we are aware that meaning is and can and should be un-
veiled, discovered, and revealed . The philosophy of meaning re-
sponds to man's need to act and to judge, to know that the reality 
in which he lives and thinks is receptive to meaning because it is 
already meaningful, because what is can be denied, and from this 
negation arises the reasonable discourse of reality, the purpose of 
philosophy. 
Ferrater asks us to investigate what is, but we He ,lware that 
what is leads to the possibility that we learn to no longer see what 
is not. Let us illustrate this with a parable from Kafka. 
l'' E. Weil, J>ro/JIillll'.\ kallfims. Pui s. 1970. 105. 
211 Ibid., 10h. 
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When [ meet a pretty giri and beg her: "Be so good as to corne with me" and she 
walks past without saying a word. This is what she means to say: "You are no duke 
with a famous name, no broad American with a Red [ndian figure ... So why, pray, 
should a pret ty girllike myselfgo with yoU?"!1 
Y es, we can each go in our own directions, understanding and car-
ing little for the other, believing that the meaning which we have 
conferred up on our lives is complete, but the other does the same 
with egual assurance of his completeness. 
Between the poles ofbeing and meaning lie the realm of expe-
rience, realms of maximum being and minimum meaning, realms 
of maximum meaning and minimum being, realms where we 
move from good to evil and those in which we move from evil to 
the good, realms where being and meaning intersect, realms ofthe 
understanding, in which and through which, the historical experi-
ence of man reveals the str~ggle for power, the force of deception, 
violence, and the dia bolic. rhe philosopher learns from literature, 
politics, history, from fables, parables, and satire the nature of 
man and the experiences which emerge from it. Ferrater's thought 
sends the reader in all directions. La Fontaine, that wonderfu1 
poet of Fab/es and the Contes et Nouvelles, tells us afable of the 
1amb and the wo1fillustrating that perennia1 strugg1e with the doc-
trine of "might is right". He says: 
Might is right: the verdict goes to the strong 
To prove the paint won't take me lang 
A !amb was once drinking 
From ,1 clcar stream when a foraging wolf came slinking 
Out of the wood s, drawn to that quarter of the country-
side by hunger. H ow dare you muddy my drinking 
water! said th e bcast of prey in anger. 
You shall be punish ed tor your inso lence. Your majesty, 
11 COil/l'lc/e S/ories, 383-84. 
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answered the !amb, 1 beg you not to be angry but to 
think ealmly about it. Here 1 am, relieving my throat 
of dryness at least twenty yards downstream from your 
Highness, and in consequenee 1 eannot be in the least 
guilty of sullying your royal drink. But you are, 
said the pitiless beast. 
Besides, 1 know you spoke ili of me last year. How eould 
1 have done this? 1 wasn 't even here, the lamb 
replied. l'm still at the teat of my mother. Ir 
it wasn't you it must have been your brother. 
1 haven't got one. Well, then, one or your sheep; 
For you and your shepherds and damned dogs keep mak-
ing it harder and harder for me to eat. But now 
Revenge is mine - and revenge is sweet! 
Whereupon he dragged the lamb deep into the forest 
and had his meal. There was no right of appeal." 
In the realm of the sensible, man is not free; he is determined like 
all phenomena by his historical situation, determined by time and 
space, determined by a myriad of conditions, relationships, and 
modes. Man's freedom belongs to his supraempirical reality, free 
in terms of the morallaw and its immediacy and presence, free in 
terms of reason, the universal, free because he is the embodiment 
of the "fact of reason", which 
has no need ofdeduction which would be inconeeivable, given the fact that such 
a deduction supposes a law above the law. It is and since it is, man is free; there is 
only law for a free manY 
Experience stands not only between being and meaning, but bet-
ween freedom, the supraempirical, and the empirical, between the 
!! "The Wolfand ihe Lamb", in Selt'c/t'd Fabln, New York, 1979, 18-21. 
1.\ E. Weil, "Faudra-t-il de nouveau parler de moral? in Sa7lOir,jaire, espàrr: 
Les Limi/es di' la rúrol/, Brussels, 1976, 276. 
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understanding and the "fact or rea son ", between the organization 
of the sensible and the need to know reason as the immediacy of 
freedom, to know that reality is meaning and that being is mean-
ing because it already belongs to a reality that is meaningful. Every 
aspect of experience is meaningful because we can as sume that 
freedom is, that every condition can be denied, that even though 
there is no correspondence between the demands ofthe morallaw 
and the morality of the historical condition, we are, nevertheless, 
compelled by reason - if we have committed ourselves to reason, 
a commitment we do not necessarily have to make - to realize the 
moral in the historical. 
Every aspect ofhuman life, be it the historical, the literary, or 
the scientifÏc, is rooted in the need to discover and unveil purpose. 
If we are capable of transforming or transfÏguring experie~~e into 
the parabolic or the paradoxical, translating it into the fable or the 
tale, or if we seek the meaningful in the speculative and the hypo-
thetical, we are in search of purpose, given to the fact that we are 
nat in control of the facts and need to speculate and think, that 
the experience which we encounter yields more to an imagination 
that can interrogate it, create metaphors and symbols, an imagina-
tion that is awakened by the world about it and is realized through 
it. The problem of meaning is correlated to the commitment to 
meaning, a commitment which we must assume because the as-
sumption is a conscious and reasonable decision. We are even 
more aware of the problem of meaning in the realization that the 
course ofhistorical events has little relationship to the expression 
of the morallaw and the freedom and universality it establishes as 
facto From this perspective we must corne to terms with philoso-
phical faith; it is in this faith in the morallaw that we challenge the 
course ofhistory, the violence, the struggle for power, and the dia-
bolic knowledge which it manifests. This moral faith is the 
strength which the philosopher expresses in his search for univer-
66 WILLIAM KLUBACK 
sality, his refusal to accept the formulae of might is right or the om-
nium be/fum contra omnes. This faith is in the reasonableness of 
reality, the fact that freedom is and that universality is the perspec-
tive from which and to which empirical reality is judged and acted 
upon. Whatever field of human endeavor we tum to, we find in 
the thinking scientist, historian, or man ofliterature that faith in 
meaning and purpose which makes the human endeavor signifi-
cant for man o 
George F. Kennan, ambassador, historian, thinker, has forced 
us to think and rethink our position in the world. We cite him not 
to line up behind his political views, but because his works create 
that communication among men which makes discourse, reason-
able discourse, possible. In an article "Western Decadence and 
Soviet Moderation" he makes the following observations: 
Poar oId West : succumbing feebly, dJy by dJY, to its own decJdence, sliding into 
debility in the slime ofits own selt~indulgent permissiveness; its drugs, its crimes, 
its pornogr Jphy, its pJmpering to youth, its Jddiction to bodily com forts, its ram-
pJnt materialism Jnd consumerism - Jnd then trembling before the menJce of 
the wicked RussiJI1S, Jll pictured as supermen, eight feet tall, their problems all 
essentially solved, with nothing to think Jbout except how to bring dJmJge Jnd 
destruction to Western Europe. This persistent externalization of the sense of 
danger- this persistent eXJggeration ofthe tlueat from without and blindness to 
the threJt from within: this is the symptom ofsome deep bilurc to come to terms 
with reality - and with one's self.2~ 
Whatever be said for Kennan's perspective, for his moral position 
demanding that we pay attention to the moral quality of our lives 
and the life of the nation, it is the moral problem which is the 
heart of his thinking, and although it may seem strange that this 
voice of puritanism resounds through the land, we must apprecia-
2~ Declini' of Ibe Wesl? Geor;~e KeJlJlI/J1 lllld Hi." erilin, Washington, D.e., 
Ethics and Public Policy Ccntcr. I <Jn. H-<J. 
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te the call which it utters, demanding that we look into ourselves 
and find justification for our struggle with Soviet power from a 
moral con cern with the quality of our social and political lives. 
We are asked to consider what we are defending and why we 
should defend. Socrates walked through the marketplaceand with 
irony asked men to face the purpose and values of th'eir lives. 
Committed, as men devoted to the problem of meaning and va-
lues, men who wager their existence on moral discussions from a 
universal point of view, we cannot but take seriously the challenge 
which Kennan throws to us. Ferrater, in all his books, and we must 
mention his latest, Applied Ethics: From Abortion to .vio/ence, has 
made it clear that ethical questions are the permanent con cerns of 
men who are dedicated to a more humane world where not only 
the rights of man, but of animals and nature are respected and 
considered. Ethics, h~ tells us, do not and should not belong only 
to the philosophers. Agreeing with Aristotle, Ferrater believes it 
would not be prudent if it were so. 
Ethics can and must also be in the hands ofthe biologist , ethnologist, sociologist, 
anthropologist, economist, etc.; in fact, it can and must be in the hands of every-
one because everyone has an interest in it. Everyone means the entire human spe-
cies together with all other living beings . Nothing less. 25 
This last statement ofFerrater gives us insight in to what we have 
called his tenderness for the finite, for allliving beings; no longer 
are the animals excluded, no longer is nature put aside, but alllife 
is precious and meaningful, and this is Ferrater's fundamental 
ethical conviction and faith. The education of man is rooted in 
the preciosity oflife, in the commitment to the universality of the 
morallaw and the freedom which it embodies, a freedom linked to 
the struggle for the rights of all living beings. 
25 Élica aplicada, 40. 
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From parable to paradox, to fable, to satire and critique, we 
have been sent in all directions by Ferrater's thinking about being 
and meaning. We have not attempted to repeat what he has to say; 
the reader can do that on his own. We have dialogued and discour-
sed with him; this is the true and genuine philosophical experien-
ce which the works of Ferrater make possible. He doesn't impose 
upon us; he requires that we lis ten to him and think for ourselves; 
in that he causes us to think, he has performed his philosophical 
task; that we think because of him is our obligation; that he has 
centered the ethical problem at the core of the philosophical con-
cern, brings us into the genuine discourse of philosophy. Ferrater 
has identified philosophy with human action; he has made us 
aware of our responsibility for social and politicallife; he has ca-
lled our attention to that deeper concern for alllife, for the need to 
comprehend not only a thinking which conforms to existent 
values, but one which does not, and revolts from it, seeking to 
awaken new dimensions of moral reality which correspond to an 
ever-growing awareness that man and world are expanding, and 
this expansion must be correlated with a moral consciousness 
equal to its task. 
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